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I
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CORPORATION, a

~rporation,
I

I

Plaintiff and Respondent,

I

I
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rEVE P. ARRINGTON,

I

Case No. 11379

and

tefe:d:n:s ~ and Appellants.:

I

BRIEF

I
I

OF

APPELLANTS

i

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
Plaintiff brought action upon a uniform real estate
ntract, electing to treat said contract as a note and
rtgage and seeking foreclosure of defendants' interests
llie subject property; defendants answered, denying
~terial allegations of the complaint and asserting

,
t

veral affirmative defenses, and also counterclaimed

imst plaintiff for damages and for specific performance

1

'.

said contract.

DISPOSITION OF CASE BELOW
The trial court granted swnrnary judgment in favor of

iPJaintiff and against defendants.

i

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants-appellants seek reversal of said summary

,judgment, with instructions to dismiss respondent's complaint.

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS
Plaintiff commenced the instant action by filing an
unverified complaint, signed by counsel for plaintiff. (R.1-2)
Tue complaint was subsequently served upon defendantso

(R.3-4

The complaint seeks foreclosure of defendants' interests
in their home, which was sold to them and to one George
idward Peacock, as joint tenants, under a certain real
estate contract dated January 20, 1965, with plaintiff's
assignors, Wendell L. Butcher and Irene B. Butcher, his wife.

IR, 8)

In addition to plaintiff's request for foreclosure

mdsale of defendants' interests in the subject property,
Plaintiff prays for an adjudication of the total amount owing
oy

defendants to. plaintiff Under the contract (including

attorney fees and costs of suit) and for a deficiency
:udgment, if appropriate. (R. 2)
Although the joint tenancy of George Edward Peacock
~the

subject property clearly appears on the face of the

:e 01 estate contract in question (R. 8), plaintiff did not
t'!Irie

Mc. Peacock as a party defendant (R. 1) and plaintiff

-2-

i:oS made no effort to join said joint tenant, al though such

ljoinder would have been and is possible.

(R. 13)

The

I subject real property is situate in Salt Lake County, where
the

instant action was corrunenced.

(R. 8)

Defendants engaged the services of present counsel of
:ecord, who subsequently served and filed a notice of
I

ippearance. (R. 5)
Thereafter, without requesting an answer or otherwise

icorrununicating with counsel for defendants, plaintiff served
jwdfiled a motion for surrunary judgment. (R. 6)

Said motion

lasked for a money judgment against defendants in the followins
I
! arounts:
I

$12,420.44
$ 1,082.97
$
19.80
$ 2,000.00

principal
interest and property tax
court costs
attorney fees (R. 6)

Plaintiff's motion for surrunary judgment was based upon
the following papers, according to plaintiff ( R. 6-7):

(a)
:~

a photocopy of the aforesaid real estate contract

·cetween plaintiff's assignor, as vendor, and the defendants
'

1'1'i Mr.

(b)

Peacock, as joint vendees (R. 8);
a photocopy of an assignment of the vendor's

bteres t in the subject property to plaintiff, which assign'nt cc.'rrectly names the vendees as being "Mathew

c.

A,rington and Geneve P. Arrington and George Edward

-3-

:f2acock" (R. 9);

I

I

(c)

a photocopy of a demand lette~ sent by plaintiff

lw defendants (R. 10);

i
!

(d)

Iiwsonal

an affidavit by one Jon Brown, not made on
knowledge, asserting that there was due and owing

I

I

ity defendants under the subject real estate contract "the

!

i:'.im of $13,503.41 consisting of $12,420.44 principal as of

I
ljune,

1967 and interest from June 20, 1967 to August 1, 1968,

I

!:nthe amount of $799.18 and property tax of $283.79" (R. 11)

I

rnd

(e)

the court file, which for purposes of the summary

Judgment motion then consisted only of plaintiff's unverified·
:omplaint. (R. 1-2)

1

Prior to the original date set for the hearing on
;lain tiff's motion for summary judgment, defendants served

'lpon counsel for plaintiff their Answer and Counterclaim
!R, 13-16), the _answer~ and statements of which were sworn
to by defendant Mathew c. Arrington on his own personal

rr1owledge. (R. 15)
Defendants' Answer unequivocally denied paragraphs

i, 4 and 5 of plaintiff's compla:int, directly controverting
;,! sworn testimony, on the personal knowledge of defendant
':Jthew

c.

Arrington, the unsworn allegations of plaintiff

:egarding the following material issues of fact:
_/1_

whether defendants were in default under the terms

(1)
~ che

subject real estate contract;

(2)

whether there was then due and owing on said

~ntract to plaintiff from defendants the principal sum of

112,420.44, together with interest; and

(3) whether plaintiff was entitled to $1,458.00 as a
~easonable

attorney's fee. (R. 1-2, 13)

In their Answer, defendants also asserted two affirmative
~efenses:
I

(1)

that plaintiff had failed to join an indispensable

~arty, narnel y, George Edward Peacock ( R. 13 ) ; and

(2)

that plaintiff was not a real party in interest, for

ithe reason that by May, 1967, plaintiff (or its assignor) had
~en

fully paid its equity in the subject property and should

have conveyed title to defendants as required by the terms
1of the uniform real estate contract in question.

I

I
10

In their

defendants alleged three causes

f action against plaintiff:

(1)

1: ad
1

Counterc~aim,

(R. 13-14)

that at some time prior to June, 1967, defendants

paid the contract balance down to the mortgage balance,

Entitling defendants to specific performance of plaintiff's
obligation to convey title to defendants under paragraphs
: illld 8 of said contract (R. 8, 14, 15);
( 2)

that following the aforesaid failure of plaintiff

-5-

..

tr convey

title to defendants, the plaintiff wrongfully

rortinued to receive payments from defendants to which

I"

Iplaintiff

was not entitled, thereby entitling defendants to

icoCTiptnsatory damages (R. 14, 15); and
(3)

that plaintiff acted wilfully and maliciously in

continuing to receive said payments from defendants after
plaintiff had no equity in the subject real property,

;entl tling defendants to punitive damages. (R. 14-15)
On August 1, 1968, the original date set for the
lmrnmary judgment hearing, defendants served upon counsel

lfor plaintiff their motion to dismiss for failure to join
/anindispensable party.
I

(R. 12)

On the same date, said

':,ming was continued until August 20, 1968, at the request
'Of

counsel for plaintiff.

(R. 6)

On August 8, 1968, plaintiff served and filed a motion
!for appointment of a receiver (R. 20) and a Reply to Counter:iaim of defendants. (R. 18)
In its Reply to Counterclaim of defendants, plaintiff:
(1)

generally denied all allegations in defendants'

tiirst Cause of Action;

(2)
:~cond

generally denied all allegations in defendants'

Cause of Action;

(3)

failed to respond in any way to defendants' Third

::iuse of Action;

-6-

(4}

failed to respond in any way to defendants' First

~ffirmative

(5}

Defense; and

failed to respond in any way to defendants' Second

l

11.ffirmative Defense. (R. 18)
·

As of August 8, 1968, all of the pleadings and other

papers hereinabove mentioned were on file in the instant

1

[action. (R. 1-18)

!

On August 20, 1968, heard arguments of both parties

jwith respect to plaintiff's motions for appointment of a

receiver and for summary judgment, and with respect to
defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to join an indispensable party. (R. 28)

Both parties' motions were based

upon the aforementioned pleadings and papers on file as of

August 8, 1968, and in fact no further filings were made
until August 2 7, 1968, a week after the hearing.

On August 27, 1968, two rather incongruous documents
•ere simultaneously filed:
(1)

the summary judgment from which the instant appeal

'is taken (R. 28-29); and
I

( 2)

plaintiff's "Motion to determine the amount of

..1._,
erendants' indebtedness, entry of decree o f f orec 1 osure
~d notice."

1

(R. 22-23)

In addition to denying defendants' motion to dismiss
: for failure to join an indispensable party (R. 28), the

I

l

-7-

,~11 nary

judgment entered by the court below reads in

rertinent part as follows:

I

"NOW, THEREFORE, in accordance with the
motion for swnrnary judgment, judgment is
hereby entered in favor of plaintiff and
against defendants, the amount of said indebtedness will be determined by the
attorneys for the parties or by a subsequent motion • • • • " (R. 28)
Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment did not purport

i

!to seek only a partial judgment (R. 6), and the trial court
jdid not purport to make "an order specifying the facts that

I

appear without substantial controversy, including the extent

to '•lhich the amount of damages or other relief is not in

i

lcontroversy, and directing such further proceedings in the
!

action as are just," as contemplated by Rule 56 (d).

On the

;record before it, the trial court simply entered judgment
I

"in favor of plaintiff and against defendants," thereby
idjudicating all issues of fact and law raised by the

/record before the; court.:
I

Paradoxically, while purporting to adjudicate all issues
odversely to defendants, the trial court's judgment added

!.

l:r11t "the amount of said indebtedness will be determined

'ty the attorneys for the parties or by a subsequent motion"
;, 2Hl-- despite the fact that plaintiff's swnrnary judgment
· •tion had been addressed solely to that factual issue:

-8-

"Plaintiff moves for summary judgment pursuant
to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56, in favor of
plaintiff and against the defendants in the amount
of $12,420044 principal, $1,082097 interest and
property tax (from and including June 20, 1967,
to and including August 1, 1968) $19.80 court
costs, and attorney fees of $2,000.00 in this
matter for the reason and upon the grounds as
follows • • • • " (R.6)
As indicated above, on the same day that the court
I

i

relow entered summary judgment against defendants, the

flaintiff filed an ingenious motion, apparently designed
I

!to resolve several genuine issues of material fact which

i

~ad

not been resolved by the summary judgment, without the

inconvenience of a trial :
"Plaintiff above named, by and through its
attorney, Alan D. Frandsen, hereby moves the
Court to find the defendants indebted to the
plaintiff in the amount of $12,420.44 principal,
$1,082.97 interest and property tax (interest
and property tax is computed from and including
June 20, 1967, to and including August 1, 1968),
$19.80 court costs and $2,000.00 attorney fees,
said amount of indebtedness is set forth by the
plaintiff in its affidavit on file herein.
Plaintiff seeks a decree of foreclosure for the
amount of said indebtedness." CR. 22)
On August 30, 1968, defendants filed a jury demand.

l'H,

25)

On September 3, 1968, defendants filed an affidavit

/:r,apposition to plaintiff's post-judgment motion, pointing

I
I

!Q't that defendants had a constitutional right to trial by
I

I

i]Ury and reiterating defendants' prior, sworn testimony
1 •~1 ich

had placed in question essentially all material facts

~ged by plaintiff in the instant action. CR. 26-27)

On September 13, 1968, defendants timely filed their

notice of appeal from the court below to. this Court (R. 32),
together with their designation of record of appeal (R. 31)
ind certificate of nonreliance on transcript of evidence.

(R, 30)

ARGUMENT
POINT

I

THE TRIAL COURT WAS WITHOlYr JURISDICTION TO
ENTER JUDGMENT OF FORE°-'OSURE AGAINST APPELLANTS
WHERE IT WAS A MATTER OF RECORD THAT RESPONDENT
HAD FAILED TO JOIN AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY, A
JOINT OWNER OF THE SUBJECT REAL PROPERTY.
Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires
that "persons having a joint interest shall be made parties •

'.

II

As is apparent on the face of the real estate contract
under which plaintiff-respondent brought the instant fore-

closure action, the defendants-appellants hold the subject
.real property in· joint tenancy with one George Edward
Peacock.

Obviously, Mr. Peacock must be joined in the

: instant action, as required by the express mandate of
I

/Rule 19.

I

Rule 19 is declaratory of the rule of joinder of parties
'::hich has long been established in Utah.

This Court has

. clearly held that in a foreclosure action, the trial court
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0,ust

require joinder of. all known owners of the subject

: prciµerty.

Hoyt v. Upper Marion Ditch Co., 94

u. 134, 76 P.2d

I

'

I 234
i

( 19 38) •

Accord:

iP.2dl033 (1932).

Mickel son v. Anderson, 81 U. 444, 19
Cf. Garner v. Anderson, 67

Pac. 496 (1926); Palle v. Industrial Corrun'n, 79

u.

553, 248

u. 47, 7 P.2d

284 (1929); Stone v. Salt Lake City, 11 U.2d 196, 356 P.2d 63]

' (1960).

I

As this Court pointed out in Hoyt, the joinder requirement is especially pertinent in a foreclosure proceedings,
for the reason that failure to determine all outstanding
interests in the subject property must inevitably depress
the price offered by bidders at a sheriff's sale of the

property, thereby depriving the judgment debtor of a fair

i liquidation of his interest in the property.
Further, respondent cannot be heard to complain of
• any jurisdictional difficulties in joining Mr. Peacock as
/a party defendant, because in rem or quasi-in rem juris-

diction is obviously supplied by the situs of the subject
real property within the territorial jursidiction of the

court below.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ENTERING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AGAINST APPELLANTS WHERE THERE REMAINED SEVERAL
GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT TO BE TRIED.

-11-

(a)

The judgment entered below can only be viewed
as purporting to adjudicate all issues raised
by the pleadings.

This Court may well be tempted to try to make some sense
out of the confusion below, by treating the judgment unde.i;review as if it were a partial summary judgment.

However,

the record simply will not sustain such a construction of

I.the lower court's action.
Respondent's motion for summary judgment obviously was
not intended to seek only a partial adjudication but was
.

!

calculated to obtain a final adjudication of all issues
in the case.

Similarly, the trial court's judgment--made "in
nccordance with the motion for summary judgment"--in no

i way

complies with the requirements of Rule 56(d), regarding

cases not fully adjudicated on motion.

The court did not

even attempt to make "an order specifying the facts that
appear without substantial controversy, including the
extent to which the amount of damages or other relief
is not in controversy," as required by Rule 56 ( d) •

True,

the court did append a legally meaningless direction that
the parties determine certain unresolved issues of fact
'b}' the attorneys for the parties or by a subsequent
'" 0

L

t1.on" (R

0

28), but the operative portion of the summary

iudc:Jll1ent clearly stated that "judgment is hereby entered

-12-

, in favor of plaintiff and against defendants •
'.~nn

0

•

o" (R. 28)

the record before the trial court, that judgment

necessarily resolved all issues theretofore raised by the
' porties favorably to respondent and unfavorably to appellants.
Therefore, the judgment here under review can only be
viewed as purporting to adjudicate all issues raised by the
: pleadings and other papers of record as of August 8, 1968,
which was the last date of filing of such pleadings and
other papers and which was more than 10 days in advance
of the surrunary judgment hearing.
(b)

Respondent failed properly to support its
summary judgment motion as to any fact
alleged in its complaint.

The only sworn statement submitted by respondent in
support of its motion for summary judgment was the affidavit
of Jon Brown (R. 11), which: (1) was not made upon personal
knowledge, as required by Rule 56(e); and (2) asserted only
that a certain amount of money was due and owing from
appellants.

Said affidavit did not assert that appellants

were in default, nor did it deal with any other issue in
t-he instant case.
Aside from said affidavit, the only support for
:espc,ndent 1 s summary judgment motion consists in the
uns 111orn, unverified allegations of respondent's complaint.
(R. 1-2)
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(c)

Appellants properly supported their defenses
and counterclaims by sworn statements made
upon personal knowledge.

Against the insufficiently supported allegations of
respondent, appellants placed in the record below their

sworn denials upon personal knowledge of essentially all
material facts alleged by respondent.

(R. 13, 15)

In addition to their direct, sworn contravention of
respondent's material allegations, the appellants countered
: with affirmative defenses and counterclaims which were sworn

i

~to under
56(e).

oath and upon personal knowledge, pursuant to Rule
(R. 13-15)

As this Court has observed, Engstrom v. Bushnell,
20

u. ?d 250, 436 P.2d 806, 809 (1968) (Justice Ellett,

dissenting) , an answer and counterclaim sworn to by one
defendant upon personal knowledge is to be considered as
an affidavit for purposes of a Rule 56 motion.

v. Kolb, 145 F.2d 344 (D.C~ Cir. 1944);

Williams

Fletcher v.

~folk Newspapers, 239 F.2d 169 (4th Cir. 1956).

Even i f appellants' verified answer and counterclaim
i:ete not compliant with Rule 56(e), the most favorable view
Df

the record from respondent 1 s standpoint would be that

'.l:i· record reveals a direct conflict between unsupported
3 llegations

on both sides as to the merits of respondent's

complaint.

Clearly, then, on any view of the record,

...
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there exist genuine issues of fact which preclude a summary
judgment.
1

If there were ever any legitimate reason to

doubt that, such doubt was removed when respondent made its

, post-judgment motion to determine the amount of indebtedness
(R, 22-23) -- the only question of fact which had been

submitted under oath by respondent to the trial court
j

in support of respondent's motion for summary judgment.
Thus, by making such a post-judgment motion, respondent
tactitly admitted that the trial court had not properly

l

determined even the single factual issue sworn to by
respondent.

Indeed, after said post-judgment motion was

denied, the respondent compounded the confusion by giving
r1otice of trial setting (R. 34) on the same day that
' appellants gave notice of appeal to this Court. (R. 32)
(d)

Respondent failed to respond in any way
to certain of appellants' defenses and
counterclaims.

As pointed out heFeinabove in our Statement of the
, Case,· respondent made absolutely no response to either of
appellants' two affirmative defenses or to appellants' Third
Cause of Action.
This Court has squarely held that, where no reply has
~i:en made to an affirmative defense which would defeat the
· ~JUse

i

of action, it is the duty of the trial court to grant

judgment in accordance with the affirmative defense.

-15-

libarri v. Christenson, 2 U.2d 367, 275 P.2d 170 (1954).

CONCT,USION
We believe it is clear that, at the very least,
ppellants are entitled to a reversal of the summary
udgment entered by the court below, there being unresolved
.everal genuine issues of material fact--both with respect
prespondent's complaint, and with respect to the affirmtive defenses and counterclaims asserted by appellants

1

l!lder oath and upon personal knowledge.

Further, appellants

ire entitled to dismissal of respondent's complaint

iecause of respondent's failure to join an ir:i.dispensable
larty.

We therefore ask this Court to vacate the judgment

lf the court below, with instructions to dismiss respondent's

:ompla.int and to maintain jurisdiction as to appellants'
:ounterclaims.
Respectfully submitted,
SALT LAKE COUNTY BAR
LEGAL SERVICES, INC.
By: Richard L. Young
431 South Third East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Appellants

